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Abstract
In many contexts, players interact only with a subset of the whole population,
i.e., players interact on a network. This paper a setting in which players are located
on a network and play a ﬁxed game with their neighbors. Players have incomplete
information on the network structure. They have a common prior over the network,
and in addition, they know the number of connections they have. That is, their type is
their degree. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the speciﬁcation
of players’ beliefs. We show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only
if they assign similar probabilities to all local events, i.e., to all events involving the
types of a player and his neighbors. This means that in order to fully explore the
range of possible strategic outcomes, it suﬃces to vary the type distribution and the
correlation among player types. On the other hand, it is not enough to vary only the
type distribution, which has been the focus of much of the literature so far.
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In many contexts, an agent’s well-being primarily depends on his own behavior and on
the behavior of those with whom he has a direct relationship, rather than on the behavior
of the population at large. Indeed, Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) and Tucker (2006) ﬁnd
that an individual’s decision to adopt a particular communication technology is primarily
inﬂuenced by the adoption decisions of those with whom he interacts directly, rather than
by the overall adoption level in the population. Also, an agent’s connections provide access
to various resources such as information, knowledge and capital. For instance, a key suc-
cess factor for a ﬁrm in a high-tech sector such as the biotechnology industry is its position
in a network of R&D partnerships (Powell et al., 1996).1 Hence, in a variety of settings,
the networks formed by agents’ relations are important in determining economic outcomes.
These networks are generally large and complex, and evolve rapidly over time (e.g. Powell
et al., 2005). This suggests that agents often do not know the exact structure of the net-
work they belong to.2 At the same time, it is unclear what beliefs agents have about their
networks.3 Hence, in settings where agents interact strategically with their neighbors on a
network under incomplete information on the network structure, it is important to assess
how game-theoretic predictions depend on the assumptions on players’ beliefs. This is the
topic of the current paper.
More speciﬁcally, we study a setting in which players are located on a network and
play a ﬁxed game with their neighbors. Payoﬀs only depend on a player’s own action
and characteristics and on the actions and characteristics of his neighbors. Players have
a (common) prior over the network, and, in addition, they have some local information.
Each player is informed of the number of neighbors he has in the network, i.e., a player’s
type is his degree. This deﬁnes a Bayesian network game. Since the interest in such games
is usually on the eﬀect of network characteristics on the behavior of players, we focus on
symmetric equilibria, as in much of the literature (cf. Galeotti et al., 2006; Jackson and
1Other empirical studies that highlight the role of networks in economic settings include Coleman et al.
(1966) and Conley and Udry (2005) on the diﬀusion of new technologies in medicine and agriculture, respec-
tively, Granovetter (1974) on job search, and Fafchamps and Lund (2003) on informal insurance networks
in developing countries.
2Krackhardt and Hanson (1993) report that informal networks are mostly unobservable to senior execu-
tives. Also, Powell et al. (1996, p.120) observe that in R&D collaborations in biotechnology, “beneath most
formal ties [...] lies a sea of informal relations”.
3Evidence suggests that agents use simple heuristics (Janicik and Larrick, 2005), and that their perception
of the network is biased (e.g. Kumbasar et al., 1994), even in an environment with strong incentives (Johnson
and Orbach, 2002).
2Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan, 2005). We deﬁne a function that for any two priors gives their
strategic distance. Loosely speaking, the strategic distance between two priors is small if
for any game in which players hold one of these priors, for any symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in that game, there is a symmetric approximate equilibrium in the associated
game with the other prior such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are close under both equilibria
(cf. Kajii and Morris, 1998). If that is the case, players can obtain approximately the same
ex ante expected payoﬀs under both priors, and we say that the two priors are close in a
strategic sense. We study the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for two priors to be close in
a strategic sense. We thus consider a type of lower hemicontinuity of the correspondence of
(interim) approximate equilibria in Bayesian network games (see Engl, 1995, for a discussion
of diﬀerent continuity concepts).
Our main result (Theorem 4.2) shows that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and
only if they assign similar probabilities to local events, i.e., events that involve the types of
a player and his neighbors. This result has two important implications. Firstly, it indicates
that in order to fully explore the possible strategic outcomes in Bayesian network games, it
is suﬃcient to vary the type distribution and the correlation among player types. Hence, on
the one hand, varying the type distribution, as has been the focus of much of the literature
so far (see below for a discussion of this literature), is not enough. On the other hand, the
result limits the set of priors that one needs to consider, as we show that priors need only
be varied along two dimensions.
Secondly, Theorem 4.2 implies that we can interpret a Bayesian network game as a set
of overlapping “local” games, so that we do not need to concern ourselves with the nonlocal
features of priors. This can best be understood by means of a concrete example. For instance,
consider two priors, and suppose that one of the priors assigns positive probability only to
networks that are isomorphic4 to the network in Figure 1(a), with each of the networks in this
isomorphism class having equal probability, while the other prior assigns positive probability
only to networks isomorphic to the network in Figure 1(b), and each of the networks in this
isomorphism class has equal probability. Clearly, these priors are identical in terms of the
probabilities assigned to local events, i.e., in terms of the events involving the types of a
player and his direct neighbors, but very diﬀerent in terms of the probabilities they assign to
global events, i.e., to diﬀerent networks. We show that, despite the diﬀerences on the global
level, the two priors are identical in terms of their strategic implications.
The motivation for the question we study comes from empirical work. The last few years,
4Roughly speaking, two networks are isomorphic if they have the same vertex set, and the vertices are

















Figure 1: The networks in (a) and (b) are identical in their local properties. That is, in both
networks, there are 6 vertices with degree 2 that are only connected to other vertices with
degree 2, and 4 vertices with degree 1, which are connected exclusively with other vertices
with degree 1.
there has been a surge in empirical work on networks, owing to the availability of data on
large-scale networks such as the World Wide Web (see Jackson, 2007, for an overview). This
work has shown that networks that are relevant for economic applications are characterized
by a number of properties. Some of these properties relate to the local environment of a
player. For instance, an important property of networks is the distribution of the number
of direct contacts that people have. Other properties are deﬁned on a larger scale. The
clustering coeﬃcient of a network, for instance, quantiﬁes the extent to which friends of your
friends are also your friends. Another example is the degree correlation, i.e., the correlation in
the number of contacts people have. An important question for game-theoretic applications
is then how these diﬀerent properties aﬀect strategic interactions on networks.
So far, most of the literature has focused on the eﬀect of varying the degree distribution,
i.e., the distribution of player types, on game-theoretic outcomes, assuming that players’
types are independent (e.g. Galeotti and Vega-Redondo, 2005; Jackson and Yariv, 2007;
L´ opez-Pintado, 2006; Sundararajan, 2005). An important question is whether game-theoretic
predictions obtained under the assumption that players’ types are independent continue to
hold if we relax this assumption. This paper shows that this is not the case. We show that
for two priors to give rise to similar outcomes (from a player’s ex ante perspective), it is not
suﬃcient that they are close in terms of the type distribution they induce, they also need
to be close in terms of the correlation among player types. Hence, while varying the type
distribution may be a good starting point, the current paper shows that one needs to go
beyond the class of random network models with a given degree distribution to fully explore
the range of strategic outcomes. At the same time, our result restricts the set of priors that
one needs to consider, as we show that priors need only be varied along two dimensions, the
distribution of types and the correlation among player types.
4To illustrate these points, we present a simple example in Section 4.2. We study a
game in which players can choose whether to invest or not. Not investing gives a payoﬀ of
zero, independent of others’ actions, while investing is only proﬁtable if all neighbors invest.
Hence, this is a game of strategic complements. We compare two priors which are identical
in terms of the type distribution they induce, but which diﬀer in terms of the correlation
among types. We show that there exists a symmetric strategy proﬁle that is a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium under one prior that is not an (approximate) equilibrium under the other prior,
and vice versa, and ex ante expected payoﬀs under equilibria under the two priors diﬀer.
These priors are thus diﬀerent in terms of strategic predictions.
The current paper is related to two distinct literatures. Firstly, this paper contributes
to the literature on Bayesian network games (e.g. Galeotti et al., 2006; Galeotti and Vega-
Redondo, 2005; Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan, 2005). This literature studies the
eﬀect of network structure on game-theoretic outcomes. In particular, Galeotti et al. (2006)
study the eﬀect of varying the type distribution and the correlation among players’ types
in a particular way in games with strategic complements and substitutes. They show that
predictions change when the type distribution and the correlation among players’ types are
varied. This illustrates that it is important to go beyond the assumption of independent
types made in the earlier literature. The current paper complements the work of Galeotti
et al. (2006) in two ways. First, we show that varying the type distribution and the type
correlation, as Galeotti et al. (2006) do, is indeed suﬃcient to capture all possible strategic
behavior in any class of Bayesian network games. Second, while Galeotti et al. (2006) focus
on gradual changes in equilibrium behavior as priors are continuously varied in terms of the
distribution of types and the type correlation, our results emphasize that it is possible to
obtain qualitatively diﬀerent outcomes if priors diﬀer in these two dimensions (see e.g. the
example in Section 4.2).
The second literature to which this paper is related is the literature on (payoﬀ) continuity
in games. Continuity issues in general Bayesian games have been studied by a number of
authors (Kajii and Morris, 1998; Milgrom and Weber, 1985; Monderer and Samet, 1996). The
question we study is similar to the question studied by Kajii and Morris (1998). While Kajii
and Morris (1998) study payoﬀ continuity in general Bayesian games, we restrict attention
to the class of Bayesian network games. Moreover, we focus on symmetric equilibria. By
exploiting the symmetry of the game, we are able to weaken the conditions of Kajii and
Morris (1998). That this can be done is not obvious. While payoﬀs only depend directly on
the actions of neighbors in our setting, actions and beliefs of those further away in the network
may have a considerable eﬀect on the payoﬀs to a player, through the eﬀect on the neighbors
5of those players and the neighbors of the neighbors of those players, and so on. There is
thus a tension between the local nature of the payoﬀs and the interdependencies intrinsic
to the network setting. Our results show that Bayesian network games can nevertheless be
treated as a collection of overlapping local games. The value of this result is that it implies
that priors need only be varied in terms of the type distribution and the correlation among
player types that they induce to explore the possible strategic outcomes.
Payoﬀ continuity has also been studied in other classes of games. Kets (2007a) studies
payoﬀ continuity in network games of incomplete information. The diﬀerence with the class
of Bayesian network games in that there is additionally uncertainty about the network size.
This makes that the player set is not common knowledge in these games; hence, they are not
Bayesian games. Also, it means that, when the network can be of any (ﬁnite) size, the type
set is countably inﬁnite. By contrast, in our games, the player set and thus the network size
is ﬁxed (and common knowledge). The type set (the set of possible degrees) is then ﬁnite.
In the class of network games of incomplete information, with a countably inﬁnite type set,
beliefs may be sensitive to small probability events (cf. Kajii and Morris, 1998). That is,
the condition we derive for strategic closeness in Bayesian network games is not suﬃcient for
network games of incomplete information. The reason is that small probability events may
considerably aﬀect outcomes through players’ conditional beliefs: even if an event has small
prior probability, it may inﬂuence a player’s actions when he thinks (given his type) that it
is likely that his neighbor think it is likely that their neighbors think it is likely...that the
small probability event is true. In the current setting, with a ﬁnite type set, this is ruled out.
This means that in Bayesian network games, it suﬃces to consider players’ prior beliefs over
local events, i.e., to vary the type distribution and the correlation among neighbors’ types.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are discussed in Sec-
tion 2. Bayesian network games are deﬁned in Section 3. The main result is presented in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Proofs that are not included in the main text can be found
in Appendix A.
2 Preliminaries
In our framework, players are located on a network. A network g is a pair consisting of
a ﬁnite, nonempty set V (g) of vertices and a ﬁnite set E(g) of edges, with an edge being
an unordered pair of two distinct vertices. Let g be a network. If {i,j} ∈ E(g), where
i,j ∈ V (g),i 6= j, then i and j are neighbors in g; alternatively, we say that i and j are
6adjacent in g. For notational simplicity, an edge {i,j} ∈ E(g) is sometimes denoted by ij.
Two networks g,g0 are isomorphic if V (g) = V (g0) =: V and there is a permutation π of V
such that {i,j} ∈ E(g) for i,j ∈ V,i 6= j, if and only if {π(i),π(j)} ∈ E(g0). This deﬁnes an
equivalence relation; hence, the set of all networks with a given vertex set can be partitioned
into a ﬁnite number of isomorphism classes, i.e., sets of isomorphic networks. In the current
setting, we associate a player with each vertex, so that edges represent the relations between
players. In the following, we therefore refer to players rather than to vertices.
Players’ beliefs are modeled by means of network belief systems. A network belief system
is a probability space (i.e., a triple consisting of a sample space, a σ-algebra, and a probability
measure on the σ-algebra) in which the sample space is a set of networks. Formally, denote
the set of positive integers by N, and let N0 denote the set of nonnegative integers. Let
n ∈ N and V (n) := {1,...,n}. Let G(n) be the set of all networks with player set V (n), and
let F (n) be the set of all subsets of G(n). Let M(n) be the set of all probability measures on
the σ-algebra F (n), and let µ ∈ M(n). Then, (G(n),F (n),µ) is a network belief system.
We are interested in the local environment of players. Let i ∈ V (n) and g ∈ G(n). The
neighborhood Ni(g) of i in g is the set of neighbors of i in g. The degree Di(g) of player i in
g is the number of neighbors of i in g, i.e., Di(g) is the cardinality of the set Ni(g). We also
consider the number of neighbors the neighbors of a given vertex have. Loosely speaking, the
neighbor degree proﬁle of a vertex in a given network is a list of the degrees of the neighbors
of the vertex, in a non-increasing order. Note that the maximum degree a player can have
is n − 1 if the total number of players is n. For t ∈ {1,...,n − 1}, let
Ω
t
K := {(k1,...,kt) ∈ {1,...,n − 1}
t | k1 ≥ k2 ≥ ... ≥ kt−1 ≥ kt}.
For t = 0, let Ωt







Let FK be the σ-ﬁeld generated by the set of singletons of ΩK. For g ∈ G(n) and i ∈ V (n)
such that Di(g) = 0, we set Ki(g) := 0. Otherwise, deﬁne
N1 := Ni(g),




Figure 2: The network g of Example 2.1.
and for ` = 2,...,Di(g):
N` := N`−1 \ {j(` − 1)},
j(`) := max{j ∈ N` | Dj(g) ≥ Dm(g) for all m ∈ N`},
Ki,`(g) := Dj(`)(g).
Then, Ki(g) := (Ki,1(g),...,Ki,Di(g)(g)) is the neighbor degree proﬁle of i in g.
Example 2.1 Suppose we draw network g in Figure 2 from the set G(4). The neighborhood
of vertex 1 in g is N1(g) = {2,3,4}, and its degree in g is D1(g) = 3. The neighbor degree
proﬁle of vertex 1 in g is K1(g) = (D4(g),D3(g),D2(g)) = (2,2,1). /
We are interested in the case in which players are ex ante identical in terms of their
network position. Throughout this paper, we therefore make the following assumption on
network belief systems:
Assumption 2.2 (Exchangeability) Let (G(n),F (n),µ) be a network belief system. The
neighbor degree proﬁles K1,K2,...,Kn are exchangeable. That is, for any k ∈ {1,...,n},
i1,...,ik ∈ V (n), the random vector (Ki1,Ki2,...,Kik) has the same distribution as the
random vector (Kπ(i1),Kπ(i2),...,Kπ(ik)) for any permutation π : {i1,...,ik} → {i1,...,ik}.
In particular, for all i,j ∈ V (n), for all θ ∈ {0,...,n − 1},
µ({g ∈ G
(n) | Di(g) = θ}) = µ({g ∈ G
(n) | Dj(g) = θ}),
i.e., the probability that a player has a certain degree is the same for each player. /
Network belief systems (G(n),F (n),µ) with this property exist. For instance, let µ be the
uniform distribution on the ﬁnite set G(n).
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let (G(n),F (n),µ) be a network belief system such that Assumption 2.2 is









(n) | D1(g) = t}

.
That is, the degree distribution of a network belief system gives for each t the probability that
a player selected uniformly at random from the network has degree t.
8Finally, for notational convenience, we assume:
Assumption 2.4 (No isolated vertices) The network belief system (G(n),F (n),µ) is such
that with probability 1, each player has at least one neighbor. That is,
µ({g ∈ G
(n) | Di(g) > 0 for all i ∈ V (g)}) = 1. /
3 Bayesian network games
A Bayesian network game is a Bayesian game where the states of nature are networks
drawn according to a network belief system and in which each player is informed of the




where N = {1,...,n} is the set of players and (G(n),F (n),µ) is a network belief system
on vertex set V (n) = N such that Assumptions 2.2 and 2.4 are satisﬁed. The probability
measure µ is players’ (common) prior. Each player i ∈ N has a nonempty, ﬁnite set Ai of pure
strategies or actions. If the state of nature/network is g ∈ G(n), player i’s private information
is his degree. Hence, the set of types or signals of player i is Ti = {0,...,n − 1} =: T and
his signal function τi : G(n) → T assigns to each network g ∈ G(n) the degree τi(g) := Di(g)
of player i. Finally, each player i ∈ N has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
ui : (×i∈N Ai) × G(n) → R.
Henceforth, we speak of type and neighbor type proﬁle rather than of degree and neighbor
degree proﬁle. Also, we will refer to the type distribution of a network belief system that
satisﬁes Assumption 2.2 to denote its degree distribution (Deﬁnition 2.3).
We assume that there exists a ﬁnite set A such that Ai = A for all i ∈ N. Furthermore,
we assume that there exists a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions v = (vt)t∈T that for each t ∈ T
gives the payoﬀ to a player of type t. More speciﬁcally, for t = 0, vt is a real function on A,
and for each (ai,a−i) ∈ An,g ∈ G(n) and i ∈ V (n) such that τi(g) = 0, ui(ai,a−i,g) = v0(ai),
i.e., the payoﬀs to an isolated player only depend on his own type and action. For t > 0, vt
is a real function on A × At × T t that is symmetric in At and T t, i.e., for all permutations










9Then, for each i ∈ V (n), g ∈ G(n) and a = (a1,...,an) ∈ An,
ui(a,g) = vτi(g)(ai,(aj)j∈Ni(g),(τj(g))j∈Ni(g)).
That is, a player’s payoﬀ only depends on his own action and type, and the actions and
types of his neighbors, and does so in an anonymous way. The bound B of a proﬁle of local









This maximum exists, as the signal set T and the action set A are ﬁnite.
Throughout this paper, we ﬁx the player set N and the action set A. A Bayesian network
game is then fully characterized by the common prior µ and its proﬁle v of local payoﬀ
functions. Henceforth, a Bayesian network game hN,G(n),(Ai)i∈N,(Ti)i∈N,(τi)i∈N,µ,(ui)i∈Ni
is therefore denoted by the pair (µ,v).
For i ∈ N, a (mixed) strategy for player i is a function σi : T → ∆(A). Denote the set
of all strategies by Σ. The probability that action ai ∈ A is played under strategy σi by
player i ∈ N given that he has type ti ∈ T is denoted by σi(ai | ti). A strategy proﬁle is a
function σ = (σi)i∈N ∈ Σn, with σi a strategy of player i for each i ∈ N. For strategy proﬁle
σ = (σj)j∈N and i ∈ N, we write σ−i to denote the strategy proﬁle σ = (σj)j∈N\{i} of the
opponents of i. We say that a strategy proﬁle σ is symmetric if σi = σj for all i,j ∈ N.
We can now deﬁne expected payoﬀs. First, we introduce some notation that will be













By Assumption 2.2, µ(t) is the prior probability that any ﬁxed player has type t, and µ(F)
is the prior probability that the neighbor type proﬁle of any ﬁxed player lies in the set F.
Finally, µ(θ) is the prior probability that a ﬁxed player has neighbor type proﬁle θ.
We also introduce some short-hand notation for various conditional probabilities. Let
t ∈ T be such that µ(t) > 0. For g ∈ G(n), F ∈ FK and θ ∈ ΩK, let




µ(F | t) := µ({g
0 ∈ G
(n) | K1(g




µ(θ | t) := µ({g
0 ∈ G
(n) | K1(g




10In words, µ(g | t) is the conditional probability that the network is g given that player 1
has degree t. Similarly, µ(F | t) is the conditional probability that the neighbor type proﬁle
of player 1 lies in the set F given that he has type t. Finally, µ(θ | t) is the conditional
probability that the neighbor type proﬁle of player 1 is equal to θ, given that he has type t.
Then, the interim expected payoﬀ to player i ∈ N of action ai ∈ A under common prior
µ ∈ M(n) when he receives signal ti ∈ T with µ(ti) > 0 and when the other players play
















where we have deﬁned σNi(g) := (σj(τj(g)))j∈Ni(g) and τNi(g) := (τj(g))j∈Ni(g). Similarly, the













Deﬁnition 3.1 Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σn is an (interim) ε-equilibrium of a
Bayesian network game (µ,v) if for each player i ∈ N, for each ti ∈ T with µ(ti) > 0, each
ai ∈ A with σi(ai | ti) > 0,
ϕi(ai,σ−i;t,µ) ≥ ϕi(bi,σ−i;t,µ) − ε
for all bi ∈ A. That is, in an ε-equilibrium, a player can gain at most ε from unilateral
deviation. An ε-equilibrium is symmetric if it is a symmetric strategy proﬁle.
A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is a 0-equilibrium. By standard arguments, a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium exists for Bayesian network games. We also have the following result:
Proposition 3.2 Let (µ,v) be a Bayesian network game. Then there exists a symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of (µ,v).
For a proof, see Appendix A. For ε ≥ 0, denote the set of symmetric ε-equilibria of the
Bayesian network game (µ,v) by N ε(µ,v). In particular, the set N 0(µ,v) denotes the set of
symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria of (µ,v).
11When players play according to a symmetric strategy proﬁle, we can simplify the ex-
pressions for players’ expected payoﬀs. A symmetric strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,...,σn) ∈ Σn
can be denoted by ˆ σ := (ˆ σt)t∈T, with ˆ σt(a) = σi(a | t) for any i ∈ N the probability that
a player of type t ∈ T takes action a ∈ A. Let σ be a symmetric strategy proﬁle, and
let ˆ σ = (ˆ σt)t∈T, with, for all t ∈ T, ˆ σt(·) = σi(· | t) for any i ∈ N. For t ∈ T and type
proﬁle θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ ΩK, we write ˆ σθ to denote (ˆ σθ1,..., ˆ σθt). Then, for t ∈ T such that
µ(t) > 0, and a ∈ A, we deﬁne




µ(θ | t)vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ)
= ϕi(a,σ−i;t,µ) for any i ∈ N
to be the interim expected payoﬀ to an arbitrary player of type t of action a when players
play according to the symmetric strategy proﬁle σ and the common prior is µ. Similarly, for
a symmetric strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σn, we deﬁne







ˆ σt(a) ˆ ϕt(a, ˆ σ;µ)
= Φi(σ;µ) for any i ∈ N
to be the ex ante expected payoﬀ to an arbitrary player when players play according to the
symmetric strategy proﬁle σ and the prior is µ.
4 Strategic convergence
4.1 Strategic distance
Our objective is to deﬁne a “measure” of similarity of priors such that if two priors are
similar according to this measure, then, for each Bayesian network game in which beliefs
are given by one of the priors, for each symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game,
there exists a symmetric approximate equilibrium in the game with the same proﬁle of local
payoﬀ functions but with beliefs given by the other prior such that ex ante payoﬀs are close
under the two equilibria. If that is the case, then, for all possible payoﬀ functions, players
can obtain approximately the same payoﬀs (ex ante) under both priors. In that case, the
two priors are similar from players’ (ex ante) perspective. At the same time, we do not want
to make the conditions on priors to be similar any stricter than necessary. We thus look for
the weakest condition that guarantees that the above holds.
12Formally, let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n), and let v = (vt)t∈T be a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions. For






|ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ
0;µ
0)|,
where ˆ Φ is the ex ante expected payoﬀ function given proﬁle v of local payoﬀ functions,
and σ and σ0 are the symmetric strategy proﬁles corresponding to ˆ σ and ˆ σ0, respectively.
Hence, χ(µ,µ0;v,ε) is a measure of the diﬀerence in outcomes under µ0 and µ in terms
of ex ante expected payoﬀs when players play according to a symmetric strategy. More
speciﬁcally, for a given ε ≥ 0, for each symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under µ, we
ﬁrst ﬁx a symmetric ε-equilibrium under µ0 which minimizes the (absolute) diﬀerence in ex
ante expected payoﬀs under both equilibria, and we then take a symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium under µ which maximizes this diﬀerence. This formalizes the idea that for each
symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of a Bayesian network game with one of the priors,
there exists some symmetric approximate equilibrium of the Bayesian network game with the
other prior, such that ex ante expected payoﬀs are similar under both equilibria. However,
the function χ(µ,µ0;v,ε) is not symmetric in µ and µ0, as we would want. To obtain a






We refer to χ∗(µ,µ0;v,ε) as the strategic distance between µ and µ0 for the proﬁle v given
ε. The supremum of χ∗(µ,µ0;v,ε) over v is called the strategic distance between µ and µ0
given ε.
Note that when ε increases, the set of symmetric ε-equilibria weakly increases, as more
and more symmetric strategies will satisfy the equilibrium criterion, and the (absolute)
diﬀerence in ex ante expected payoﬀs will decrease weakly. Hence, the interesting case is
when ε comes arbitrarily close to 0. This leads us to the following deﬁnition (cf. Kajii and
Morris, 1998):
Deﬁnition 4.1 Take any µ ∈ M(n), and consider a sequence (µk)k∈N in M(n). The sequence
(µk)k∈N converges strategically to µ if for each proﬁle v of local payoﬀ functions and for each






In the next section, we give an example which illustrates the factors that are important for
strategic convergence.
134.2 Example: Local investment
For reasons that will become clear shortly, let N be the set of integers that can be written
as
Nν = (2
1 + 1)n1 + (2
2 + 1)n2 + ··· + (2
ν + 1)nν
for some ν ∈ N, with nν = 1 and for each ` ∈ {1,...,ν − 1}, n` = 2` n`+1.
Let ν ∈ N and consider the following game. There is a set of n = Nν players. Each
player has two actions, S and R. Action S is the safe action. It always gives a payoﬀ of 0,
independent of a player’s type or the actions and types of his neighbors. The payoﬀs to the
risky action R depend on the actions of a player’s neighbors in the network. More precisely,
the payoﬀs to a player of type t ∈ T,t > 0, of action R when the action and type proﬁles of


















` = R for all ` ∈ {1,...,t},
−c otherwise,
where c > 0 is some constant. An interpretation of this game is that players need to decide
whether to invest (play R) or not (play S). Investment is risky. Only if all his neighbors
invest, a player gets a positive payoﬀ from investing, otherwise he looses. Clearly, this is a
game of (strict) strategic complements, since the incentives for a player to invest increase
strictly when the number of neighbors who invest increases.
We consider two priors on (G(n),F (n)), the independent types prior and the core-periphery
prior. The core-periphery prior µcp assigns probability one to the isomorphism class of
networks that, for ` ∈ {1,...,ν}, consist of n` components with 2` + 1 players, of which
one player—the core player—is connected to all other players, and the other 2` players—
the peripheral players—are connected to the core player and to 2`−1 − 1 peripheral players.
Hence, the type (degree) of the core player in a component with 2` + 1 players is 2`, and
the type of the peripheral players in such a component is 2`−1. We assume that each of the
networks in the isomorphism class has equal probability. See Figure 3 for components that
occur with positive probability when ν is at least 3. Note that we can only construct such
networks when the number of players is an element of N.
If we deﬁne n0 = nν+1 = 0, it can easily be veriﬁed that the type distribution under µcp





Nν(nlog2(t) + 2tnlog2(t)+1) if t ∈ {1,2,4,...,2ν},
0 otherwise.
14Figure 3: Components that occur with positive probability under the core-periphery prior
when ν is at least 3. The core players are indicated with white dots, the peripheral players
by black dots.
It can be readily checked that
P
t∈N0 ξ(n)(t) = 1. In addition, it can be shown that for each







That is, the function ξ : N0 → [0,1] is a distribution (probability mass function) and has a
ﬁnite ﬁrst moment. We refer to (ξ(t))t∈N0 as the limiting (type) distribution. Furthermore,
it is not hard to verify that for ` = 2,3,...,ν − 1 the conditional probability that a player
of type t = 2` is a core player is
1 · n`





independent of `, where we have used that n` = 2`n`+1. For future reference, note that a
player with type 2` who is a core player interacts with players of type t0 = 2`−1. Similarly,
the conditional probability that a player with type t = 2` is a peripheral player is
2`+1 · n`+1





In that case, he interacts with players of type t0 = 2`+1.
We now deﬁne the independent types prior. We follow the literature (e.g. Galeotti et al.,
2006; Jackson and Yariv, 2007; Sundararajan, 2005) by assuming that under the independent
types prior, players believe that the type distribution is given by some ﬁxed distribution and
that players’ types are independent.5
5Note that these assumptions require some bounded rationality on the part of players. for two reasons.
Firstly, there exists no prior on the ﬁnite set G(n) that gives rise to independent types. Moreover, the
independent types prior, players assign positive probability to a player having a type (degree) that exceeds
15Hence, we assume that for each t ∈ N0, players’ prior belief that the type of an arbitrary
player is t is µind(t) := ξ(t). We now derive the conditional probability that a ﬁxed player has
a given neighbor type proﬁle, given his type. First note that if the probability that a player
selected uniformly at random from the network has type (degree) t is ξ(t), t ∈ N0, then the
probability that a neighbor of a player selected uniformly at random from the network has
degree t is proportional to tξ(t), as a player of degree t has t times more neighbors than a
player of degree 1. Hence, for each t ∈ N0, the probability that the neighbor of a player





Then, for each neighbor type proﬁle θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt
K, for all k ∈ N0, let ck(θ) be the






where we recall that 0! = 1. That is, M(θ) is the multinomial coeﬃcient corresponding to
θ. Then, for each t ∈ N0 such that µ(t) > 0, for each θ = (θ1,...,θt) ∈ Ωt
K, the conditional
belief that a player’s neighbor type proﬁle is θ given that he has type t is










where we have used that x0 = 1 for x > 0.6 In words, the conditional distribution of
neighbors’ type, given that the “central” player has type t is given by the multinomial
distribution. That is, the types of the player’s neighbors are drawn in t independent trials,
with the probability that a neighbor has type s given by η(s). It is important to note that
µind(θ | t) does not depend on t.
n − 1, which is clearly impossible. However, these assumptions can be justiﬁed in the following way. Kets
(2007b) discusses a network belief system that, given a distribution η with support in N0, gives rise to a prior
on G(n) that induces a degree distribution (type distribution) that is close to (η(t))t∈N0 such that degrees
(types) are almost independent when n is large. Furthermore, as shown in the next section, priors that are
close in terms of the type distribution and the correlation among player types that they induce are similar in
terms of game-theoretic predictions. This means that the results we would obtain under a type distribution
close to (ξ(t))t∈N0 and under almost independent types will be very similar in game-theoretic terms to the
results we derive here for type distribution (ξ(t))t∈N0 and independent types.
6Note that µind(t),t ∈ N0, and µind(θ | t) for t ∈ N0,θ ∈ Ωt
K, are not derived from some prior on a set of
networks, as in the rest of the paper.
16Hence, the core-periphery prior and the independent types prior are very similar in terms
of the type distribution they induce. Under the independent types prior, the type distribution
is exactly (ξ(t))t∈N0, while under the core-periphery prior it is close to (ξ(t))t∈N0 (assuming
that the number of players is large). However, the two priors are very diﬀerent in the type
correlation they induce. Under the independent types prior, types are independent. By
contrast, under the core-periphery prior, players of type 2 only interact with players of type
1,2 and 4, players of type 4 only interact with players of type 2,4 and 8, and so on.
An important question is whether the two priors are similar from a game-theoretic per-
spective. It is easy to see that under both priors, there is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in which all players invest, regardless of their type, and a symmetric Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium in which no player invests for any type he ends up having. There are also
so-called threshold equilibria in which players invest if and only if their type is above or
below some threshold. We show that there is a threshold equilibrium under the independent
types prior such that there is no corresponding symmetric approximate equilibrium under
the core-periphery prior and vice versa. Hence, the set of equilibria changes substantively
when we change the correlation among player types.
We start by showing that there is a threshold equilibrium under the independent types
prior such that there is no corresponding approximate equilibrium under the core-periphery
prior. First, for t,¯ t ∈ N0, deﬁne















When the number of players is suﬃciently large, there is a unique ¯ t ∈ {1,2,3,...,2ν−1} such
that7
f(t;¯ t) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ t ≤ ¯ t.
In that case, the expected payoﬀs under the independent types prior to a player of type t
who chooses action R when other players follow the strategy of investing if and only if their
type does not exceed the threshold ¯ t are given by f(t;¯ t). Then, it is easy to see that there is
a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under the independent types prior in which players
invest if and only if their type is at most ¯ t.8
7Such a threshold exists. For each ¯ t ∈ N0, f(t;¯ t) is declining in t, and for each t ∈ N0, f(t;¯ t1) > f(t;¯ t2)
whenever ¯ t1 > ¯ t2. Hence, there exists a unique ¯ t ∈ N0 such that f(t;¯ t) ≥ 0 if and only if t ≤ ¯ t; by choosing
the number of players large enough, we have ¯ t ∈ {1,2,3,...,2ν−1}.
8This result is not in contradiction with Proposition 2 of Galeotti et al. (2006), which shows that under
independent types and strict strategic complements, every symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is monotone
17By contrast, there does not exist a corresponding ε-equilibrium under the core-periphery
prior for ε suﬃciently small. To see this, suppose by contradiction that there would exists
a threshold ¯ t such that players would invest if and only if their type is at most ¯ t, and
consider the lowest type smin := min{s ∈ {1,2,4,...,2ν} | s > ¯ t} that does not invest
under this proposed equilibrium. The conditional probability that a player of type t = 2`,
where ` ∈ {1,2,...,ν − 1}, is a core player rather than a peripheral player, i.e., that all his
neighbors invest under the proposed equilibrium, is
1 · n`





independent of t. Consequently, the interim expected payoﬀs to a player with type smin of










Hence, for ε < c/3, it is an ε-best response to choose R for players with type smin. But
then, by the same argument, players with the next lowest type that does not invest under
the proposed strategy will also ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest (in terms of ε-best responses), and
so on. Hence, there exists no ε-equilibrium under the core-periphery prior corresponding to
the threshold equilibrium under the independent types prior if ε is suﬃciently small.
We now show that there is a threshold equilibrium under the core-periphery prior which is
not an (approximate) equilibrium under the independent types prior. Let ˆ t ∈ {1,2,3,...,2ν−1},
and consider the symmetric strategy proﬁle in which players invest if and only if their type
is at least ˆ t. As the interim expected payoﬀs of R to players of type t are declining in
t for any such threshold strategy under the independent types prior, this strategy cannot
be an ε-equilibrium under this prior for ε suﬃciently small. However, such a strategy is a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for any ˆ t ∈ {1,2,3,...,2ν−1} under the core-periphery prior. Fix
ˆ t, and suppose players play R if and only if their type is at least ˆ t. Consider a player of type
t = 2` ≥ ˆ t. With conditional probability
2`+1 · n`+1





all his neighbors play R, so that he earns a payoﬀ of 3c; with conditional probability
1 · n`





increasing in type (in the current setting, if low types invest, then high types invest, but not vice versa), as
they assume that payoﬀs satisfy some additional property that is not satisﬁed by the current example.
18some neighbors play S, giving him a payoﬀ of −c. His interim expected payoﬀs are thus
(6c/3) − (2c/3) > 0, so that he cannot gain by deviating. Now consider a player of type
t < ˆ t. With probability 1, at least some of his neighbors play S, so his best response is to
play S as well. Hence, under the core-periphery prior, there exists a threshold equilibrium
in which players invest if and only if their type exceeds some threshold.
These examples show that strategy proﬁles that are Bayesian-Nash equilibria under one
prior, may not be (approximate) equilibria under a prior which only diﬀers from the ﬁrst
prior in the type correlation it induces. Note that if the number of players is suﬃciently large,
there are multiple threshold strategies that induce a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
under the core-periphery prior. By contrast, there is a unique threshold equilibrium strategy
under the independent types prior. Hence, by choosing the constant c appropriately, we can
ﬁnd a threshold equilibrium under the core-periphery prior such that there is no symmetric
approximate equilibrium under the independent types priors that is close to this threshold
equilibrium in terms of ex ante expected payoﬀs. Hence, even though the priors are very close
in terms of the type distribution they induce (for a large number of players), the strategic
distance between them (given c and ε) can be large.
Similar examples can be constructed for other games, e.g. games with strategic substi-
tutes (cf. Galeotti et al., 2006). In the next section, we show that the type distribution and
the type correlation indeed determine the strategic distance between priors.
4.3 Main result
The example in the previous section suggests that diﬀerences in correlation among player
types are an important determinant of the strategic distance between two priors. It is
intuitive that also the type distribution induced by priors plays an important role. As we
show in Lemma 4.3 below, closeness of priors in terms of the type distribution and the
correlation among player types is equivalent to closeness in terms of the prior probabilities
assigned to local events, i.e., events involving the type of a player and his neighbors. Hence,







That is, d∗(µ,µ0) measures the diﬀerence in probabilities assigned by µ and µ0 to local
events, or, equivalently (by Lemma 4.3), the diﬀerence in the type distribution and the type
correlations induced by µ and µ0.
Theorem 4.2 establishes that convergence of priors in terms of prior probabilities assigned
to local events is in fact necessary and suﬃcient for strategic convergence.
19Theorem 4.2 Let µ ∈ M(n) and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M(n). Then, (µk)k∈N converges






The proof of Theorem 4.2 follows from Proposition 4.5 and Lemma 4.6. Proposition 4.5 shows
that if two priors µ,µ0 are close in terms of the prior probabilities assigned to local events,
then for any Bayesian network game, for any symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the
game in which players hold the prior µ, there exists a symmetric approximate equilibrium in
the game with prior µ0 such that ex ante payoﬀs are similar. Proposition 4.5 uses Lemma 4.3
and Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.3 Let µ ∈ M(n), and let (µk)k∈N be a sequence in M(n). Let T 0 be the set of types
t ∈ T such that µ(t) > 0 and µk(t) > 0 for all k ∈ N. Suppose that T 0 is nonempty, and that






k(F)| = 0 ⇐⇒
(
limk→∞ maxt∈T|µ(t) − µk(t)| = 0,
limk→∞ maxt∈T0,F∈FK|µ(F | t) − µk(F | t)| = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Lemma 4.4 Let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n), and let γ > 0. Let v be a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions
with bound B. There exists δ > 0 such that if σ is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
of (µ,v) and d∗(µ,µ0) ≤ δ, then there exists a symmetric 3γB-equilibrium σ0 of the game
(µ0,v) with σ0(· | t) = σ(· | t) for all t ∈ T such that µ(t) > 0 and µ0(t) > 0.
Proof. Deﬁne
Sµ,µ0 := {t ∈ T | µ(t) > 0 and µ
0(t) > 0}
to be the set of types that occur with positive probability under both µ and µ0. Recall that
ˆ σ = (ˆ σt)t∈T is deﬁned by:
∀t ∈ T,a ∈ A : ˆ σt(a) = σi(a | t) for any i ∈ N.
Set ˆ σ0
t := ˆ σt for all types t ∈ Sµ,µ0. For t 6∈ Sµ,µ0, take ˆ σ0
t such that (ˆ σ0
t)t6∈Sµ,µ0 induces a
symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the reduced game where each player i ∈ N with a
type t ∈ Sµ,µ0 is required to play ˆ σ0
t = ˆ σt. Such an equilibrium exists by Proposition 3.2. By
construction, σ0 is a best response for players with types t 6∈ Sµ,µ0. We need to show that σ0
is a 3γB-best response for a type t ∈ Sµ,µ0. First, let
Sµ0 := {t ∈ T | µ
0(t) > 0}
20be the set of types that have positive probability under µ0. Also, let H ∈ FK be the event
that a player interacts with at least one player with a type that has positive probability








  ∃` ∈ {1,...,t} : θ` ∈ Sµ0 \ Sµ,µ0
	
,
and let Hc be the complement (relative to ΩK) of H. By deﬁnition,
µ(H | t) = 0 for all t ∈ Sµ,µ0. (4.1)




|µ(F | t) − µ
0(F | t)| ≤ γ. (4.2)
Combining (4.1) and (4.2) gives
∀t ∈ Sµ,µ0 : µ
0(H | t) ≤ γ. (4.3)
Let t ∈ Sµ,µ0, and let a,b ∈ A with ˆ σ0
t(a) > 0. Then,
|ˆ ϕt(a, ˆ σ
0;µ














vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)

. (4.4)
By (4.3), recalling that the bound on v is B, the ﬁrst sum in (4.4) is at most γB. To evaluate
the second sum, ﬁrst note that the neighbors of a player with neighbor type proﬁle θ ∈ Hc
play according to ˆ σ. As a lies in the support of the symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium σ
of (µ,v), X
θ∈ΩK
µ(θ | t)vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) ≥
X
θ∈ΩK
µ(θ | t)vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ). (4.5)
Using that µ(θ | t) = 0 for all θ ∈ H, we can rewrite (4.5) to ﬁnd:
X
θ∈Hc
µ(θ | t)[vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)] ≥ −
X
θ∈H
µ(θ | t)[vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)]
= 0. (4.6)
Deﬁne Gt := {θ ∈ Hc | µ(θ | t) − µ0(θ | t) > 0} and let Gc
t be the complement of Gt relative
to Hc. For notational simplicity, deﬁne
Vµ,µ0(a,b; ˆ σ) :=




µ(θ | t) − µ
0(θ | t)
 
vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)

   .
21Using (4.2), it follows that




µ(θ | t) − µ
0(θ | t)







0(θ | t) − µ(θ | t)
 vt(a, ˆ σθ,θ) − vt(b, ˆ σθ,θ)
 
≤ 2γB. (4.7)
Combining (4.6) and (4.7) gives
|ˆ ϕt(a, ˆ σ
0;µ
0) − ˆ ϕt(b, ˆ σ
0;µ
0)| ≤ 3γB. 
Proposition 4.5 Let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n), and ﬁx γ > 0. Let v be a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions




Then, if σ is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game (µ,v), there exists a
symmetric 3γB-equilibrium σ0 of the game (µ0,v) such that
|ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ
0;µ
0)| ≤ 4ηB,
where ˆ σ = (ˆ σt)t∈T and ˆ σ0 = (ˆ σ0
t)t∈T are deﬁned by ˆ σt = σi(· | t) and ˆ σ0
t = σ0
i(· | t) for any
i ∈ N for all t ∈ T.
Proof. Let σ be a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of (µ,v). By Lemma 4.4, there
exists a symmetric 3γB-equilibrium σ0 of the game (µ0,v) such that ˆ σ0
t = ˆ σt for t ∈ T such
that µ(t) > 0 and µ0(t) > 0. Deﬁne
G := {θ ∈ ΩK | µ(θ) − µ
0(θ) > 0},
and let Gc be the complement of G relative to ΩK. Deﬁne the function ζ : ΩK → T by
ζ(θ) = t whenever θ ∈ Ωt
K. That is, the function ζ gives the type of a player for each
possible neighbor type proﬁle he may have. Then,
|ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ














ˆ σζ(θ)(a)|vζ(θ)(a, ˆ σθ,θ)|
≤ 2ηB. (4.8)
22Also, deﬁne
Fµ0 := {θ ∈ ΩK | µ
0(ζ(θ)) > 0},
Fµ,µ0 := {θ ∈ ΩK | µ(ζ(θ)) > 0 and µ
0(ζ(θ)) > 0}.
Then, as µ(Fµ0 \ Fµ,µ0) = 0 by deﬁnition,
µ
0(Fµ0 \ Fµ,µ0) ≤ η.
Recalling that ˆ σ0
t = ˆ σt for t such that µ(t) > 0 and µ0(t) > 0, this yields
|ˆ Φ(ˆ σ
0;µ



























































Combining (4.8) and (4.9) gives
|ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ
0;µ
0)| ≤ 4ηB. 
Proposition 4.5 establishes the suﬃciency of our condition for strategic convergence.
Lemma 4.6 below shows that the condition that d∗ should be small is also necessary for
strategic convergence.




then there exists a proﬁle v of local payoﬀ functions with bound B = 1 and a symmetric
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium σ of the game (µ,v) such that for any symmetric δ-equilibrium
σ0 of (µ0,v), it holds that
|ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ
0;µ
0)| > δ,
where ˆ σ = (ˆ σt)t∈T and ˆ σ0 = (ˆ σ0
t)t∈T are deﬁned by ˆ σt = σi(· | t) and ˆ σ0
t = σ0
i(· | t) for any
i ∈ N for all t ∈ T.
23Proof. By assumption, there exists a set of neighbor type proﬁles F ∈ FK such that





1 if θ ∈ F,
0 otherwise.
It is easy to see that
|ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ
0;µ
0)| > δ
for any two symmetric strategy proﬁles σ,σ0 ∈ Σn. 
We can now prove Theorem 4.2:
Proof. (If) Let v be a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions with bound B. Let γ > 0 be arbitrarily
small, and let δ > 0 be as in Lemma 4.4. Take any ε ∈ (0,δ]. Since d∗(µ,µk) → 0 as k → ∞,




for k suﬃciently large. That is, if d∗(µ,µk) → 0 as n → ∞, then, for any v and any c > 0,
we have χ∗(µ,µk;v,c) → 0 as k → ∞.
(Only if) Let µ,µ0 ∈ M(n). For δ ∈ [0,1), if d∗(µ,µ0) > δ, then, by Lemma 4.6, there
exists a proﬁle of local payoﬀ functions v with bound B = 1 and a symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium σ ∈ Σn of (µ,v) such that for any symmetric δ-equilibrium σ0 ∈ Σn of (µ0,v),
|ˆ Φ(ˆ σ;µ) − ˆ Φ(ˆ σ0;µ0)| > δ. 
Theorem 4.2 shows that for two priors to be close in a strategic sense, it is necessary and
suﬃcient for them to be close in terms of prior probabilities they assign to local events, i.e.,
events that involve the types of a player and his neighbors. This result has two important
implications. Firstly, this result means that in order to explore the full range of strategic
outcomes in Bayesian network games, it is suﬃcient to vary the type distribution and the
correlation among player types. Hence, on the one hand, it suggests that varying the type
distribution, as has been the focus of much of the literature so far, is often not enough. On
the other hand, it limits the set of priors that one needs to consider. We show that priors
need only be varied along two dimensions. A second important implication is that we can
interpret a Bayesian network game as a set of overlapping “local games”, and that we do
not need to concern ourselves with the nonlocal features of network belief systems. If we
refer back to the networks in Figure 1(a) and (b), and consider two priors, one which gives
probability 1 to the network in Figure 1, and the other giving probability 1 to the network
in Figure 1, we see that Theorem 4.2 tells us that these priors are identical in terms of their
24game-theoretic predictions, even though they are very diﬀerent in terms of the networks they
predict.
Hence, by exploiting the symmetry of the game and the local features of the payoﬀ
functions, it is possible to weaken the conditions of Kajii and Morris (1998) for this particular
class of Bayesian games. Kajii and Morris (1998) show that for general Bayesian games with
ﬁnite type sets, priors need to be close in terms of the prior probabilities they assign to
all possible events. By contrast, we only require that priors are close in terms of the prior
probabilities assigned to local events. While it is not surprising that we can weaken the
general result of Kajii and Morris (1998) for a subclass of games, it yields the useful insight
that we can treat Bayesian network games as a collection of overlapping local games, and
that the important features of priors in terms of strategic outcomes are the type distribution
and correlation among player types that they induce.
We end this section with a discussion of our framework and our assumptions. Firstly,
in this paper, we have focused on symmetric equilibria, as this is the focus of much of
the literature on Bayesian network games (e.g. Galeotti et al., 2006; Jackson and Yariv,
2007; Sundararajan, 2005). It is possible to derive similar results for general Bayesian-Nash
equilibria, though it will not be possible to exploit the symmetry of the game as we have
done here. If one would consider general equilibria, results similar to those of Kajii and
Morris (1998) would be obtained.
Secondly, our deﬁnition of strategic closeness requires that ex ante expected payoﬀs be
close in equilibria under two priors, i.e., we focus on payoﬀ continuity. An alternative
continuity notion would require that with high probability, a player and his neighbors follow
the same strategies under the two priors (cf. Monderer and Samet, 1996). Indeed, from the
proof of Proposition 4.5, it follows that if two priors are close in terms of the measure d∗,
then for each symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under one of the priors, there exists an
approximate equilibrium under the other prior which coincides with the ﬁrst equilibrium for
all types that have positive probability under both priors, i.e., there is also continuity in
terms of strategies. However, in the current setting (unlike in the setting of e.g. Monderer
and Samet, 1996), we also have to consider the diﬀerence in prior probabilities that players
have a given type under the two priors in order to ensure that the two priors give rise to
similar outcomes from a player’s ex ante perspective. Hence, the appropriate deﬁnition of
strategic closeness in the current setting considers diﬀerences in ex ante expected payoﬀs.
Thirdly, while we study the general case in which payoﬀs depend on the actions and types
of a player and his neighbors, one could also consider the special case in which a player’s
payoﬀs depend only on his own action and type and on the actions of his neighbors, and not
25on his neighbors’ types. Obviously, for this subclass of games, the condition we derived for
strategic convergence is still suﬃcient, though it may not be necessary. Our conjecture is
that the condition cannot be weakened substantially for this subclass of games.
Finally, in line with the literature, we have studied games in which a player’s payoﬀs only
depend on the actions and types of his direct neighbors. Our result can easily be generalized
to the case where a player’s payoﬀ depends on the actions and types of those within k steps
in the network, for some k ∈ N. Of course, when k increases, the condition for two priors to
be close becomes more strict, ultimately recovering the condition of Kajii and Morris (1998)
that priors need to be close in terms of the prior probabilities they assign to global events.
Indeed, when the payoﬀs to a player depend on the actions and types of all others in the
network (even on the actions and types of those with whom he is not directly connected),
the game can be alternatively modeled as a standard Bayesian game, with some suitable
restrictions on payoﬀs.
5 Conclusions
Networks are ubiquitous in economics, and they can have a large eﬀect on economic
outcomes. The current paper considers a setting in which players are located on a network
and play a ﬁxed game with their neighbors. Players have incomplete information on the
network structure. They have a common prior on a given class of networks, and, in addition,
they have some local information on the network structure. Given the complexity of many
social and economic networks, it is important to study whether game-theoretical predictions
are sensitive to assumptions on players’ beliefs.
In the current paper, we have studied the conditions that are necessary and suﬃcient
for two (common) priors to be close in a strategic sense. More speciﬁcally, we have studied
the conditions under which for any Bayesian network game in which players hold one of
these priors, for any symmetric equilibrium in that game, there is a symmetric approximate
equilibrium in the associated game with the other prior such that ex ante expected payoﬀs
are close under the two equilibria. Our main result (Theorem 4.2) states a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for two priors to be close in this sense is that they be close in terms of the
prior probabilities they assign to local events, i.e., events involving the type of an arbitrary
player and his neighbors. An equivalent condition is that two priors be close in terms of the
type distribution and the correlation among player types they induce (Lemma 4.3). Hence,
the essential features of a prior in Bayesian network games are the type distribution and the
type correlation it induces.
26This result suggests that one needs to go beyond priors with independent types, which has
been the focus of much of the literature so far. We have illustrated this point in Section 4.2,
where we show that priors with the same type distribution can give rise to very diﬀerent
equilibria in a simple game, depending on the correlation among player types. The current
result also puts restrictions on the set of priors one needs to consider. We show that one
only needs to vary the type distribution and the correlation among types.
There are several directions for further research. Firstly, the current result indicates
that it is important to systematically assess the eﬀect of varying the type distribution and
the correlations among player types on game-theoretic outcomes. While several authors
study the eﬀect of varying the type distribution in speciﬁc games (e.g. Jackson and Yariv,
2007; Sundararajan, 2005), there is little work on the eﬀect on game-theoretic outcomes
of changing the correlation among players’ types. Galeotti et al. (2006) analyze the eﬀect
of some speciﬁc changes in the type distribution and the correlation among player types in
certain classes of games. However, there is no systematic exploration of the eﬀect of changing
the type correlations. Such an analysis will not be easy. There are two prime diﬃculties. The
ﬁrst is that it is not clear how type correlation should be measured. Galeotti et al. (2006)
deﬁne the concepts of positive and negative association, but these only seem to capture some
dimensions of type correlation. The second is that it is hard to deﬁne suitable network belief
systems in which the appropriate dimensions of type correlations can be varied continuously
in the appropriate way.
Another direction for future research is to study the sensitivity of game-theoretic pre-
dictions to the speciﬁcation of players’ information. As in much of the literature, we have
assumed that players only know the number of connections they have. However, in reality,
players may have diﬀerent “observational horizons” (Friedkin, 1983). It is an open question
how this heterogeneity in information aﬀects outcomes. Moreover, game-theoretic outcomes
in network games will generally be diﬀerent under incomplete and complete information (see
Galeotti et al. (2006) for an example). It is not clear how predictions change if players’
information is varied from knowing only their direct environment to knowing the full net-
work structure. The current paper illustrates that it is important to study such sensitivity
questions.
27Appendix A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Deﬁne the strategic game
G := hN,(Mi)i∈N,(ˇ Φi(·;µ))i∈Ni,
where for each i ∈ N, the set of pure strategies Mi is the set of maps mi : T → A. Hence,
we have Mi =: M for all i ∈ N, and the set M is ﬁnite. For each i ∈ N, the payoﬀ function
ˇ Φi(·;µ) is deﬁned by:
∀m ∈ M




Mixed strategies are obtained by randomizing over strategies in the set M. Denote the set of
mixed strategies in G by ∆(M). Payoﬀs can be extended to mixed strategies in the standard

















where we have deﬁned mNi(g) := (mj(τj(g)))j∈Ni(g) and τNi(g) := (τj(g))j∈Ni(g).
The proof now follows from two steps:
Step 1: There exists β = (βj)j∈N ∈ (∆(M))n with βi = βj for all i,j ∈ N such that for all
i ∈ N,





Proof of Step 1: The set ∆(M) is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of the Euclidean
space R|M|, and, by standard arguments, ˇ Φi(·;µ) is continuous in β = (βi,β−i) and quasi-
concave in βi. Furthermore, the game G is symmetric by Assumption 2.2 and the symmetry
of the payoﬀ functions. Deﬁne the correspondence B on ∆(M) by:
∀β ∈ ∆(M) : B(β) := arg max
α∈∆(M)
ˇ Φi(α,β,...,β;µ) for any i ∈ N,
i.e., B(β) is the set of best responses (mixed strategies) of a player when other players
play according to β. By standard arguments, the correspondence B is nonempty, convex-
valued, and upper-hemicontinuous (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, pp. 29–30). Hence, by
28Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem (e.g. Ok, 2007, p. 331), a ﬁxed point exists for B, i.e., there
exists β ∈ ∆(M) such that β ∈ B(β).
Step 2: Let β = (βj)j∈N ∈ (∆(M))n with βi = βj for all i,j ∈ N be such that for all i ∈ N,




i ∈ ∆(M), and deﬁne σ = (σj)j∈N ∈ Σn by:











Proof of Step 2: From substituting the relevant expressions, we obtain
∀i ∈ N : Φi(σ;µ) = ˇ Φi(β;µ).






i ∈ ∆(M) by:













i,σ−i;µ) > Φi(σ;µ) = ˇ Φ(β;µ),
which contradicts that no player in G can gain by deviating unilaterally from β.





i ∈ Σ, and σi = σj for all i,j ∈ N, i.e., there exists a symmetric Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium for (µ,v).
29A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3

































































































|µ(F | t) − µ
k(F | t)| = 0.




t∈T0 |µ(t) − µ







|µ(F | t) − µ
k(F | t)| = 0. (A.2)






















|µ(F | t) − µ




k(F | t)|µ(t) − µ
k(t)|.
30By (A.1) and (A.2), there exists Q ∈ N such that for all t ∈ T 0, k > Q implies that
|µ(F | t) − µ













Hence, for k > Q,
|µ(F) − µ
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